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Abstract 
Ostracism—being ignored and excluded—threatens the basic human needs for belonging, 
self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. This work introduces belonging to a majority 
as a buffer against the immediate negative impact of ostracism on basic needs for individuals 
with a high need to belong, for whom social groups are especially relevant. Three studies 
show that for individuals high in the need to belong, need threat was attenuated by 
membership in a majority group, but not by membership in a minority group (Studies 1 and 3) 
or a group of unknown size (Study 2). By contrast, individuals low in the need to belong—
who place less importance on group membership in general—did not benefit from belonging 
to a majority group. The general pattern replicated across different manipulations of group 
membership and social exclusion, two measures of need threat, and with participants from 
two different countries. 
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Belonging to a Majority Reduces the Immediate Need Threat from Ostracism in Individuals 
with a High Need to Belong 
Social connections play an important role in maintaining physical and psychological 
health and well-being (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995, for a review). In accord with this, a 
large body of research shows that ostracism—being ignored and excluded by others—results 
in serious negative consequences (see Williams, 2007, 2009, for a review). It is well-
documented that ostracism poses an immediate threat to the four basic human needs for 
belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence, and increases negative affect (e.g., 
Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000; Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). 
There are several situational factors that may be expected to mitigate immediate 
reactions to ostracism, but most of them have failed to do so. For instance, ostracism remains 
painful and distressing even when individuals are ostracized by out-group members (Smith & 
Williams, 2004; Williams et al., 2000; Wirth & Williams, 2009) or by those they despise 
(Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007), because of technical difficulties (Eisenberger, Lieberman, 
& Williams, 2003) or because of a preprogrammed script (Zadro, et al., 2004), and even if 
individuals have to pay for inclusion (van Beest, & Williams, 2006). 
Recent studies, however, have revealed mitigating circumstances (for an overview, see 
Eck, Schoel, & Greifeneder, 2016). For instance, ostracism is less painful when those 
ostracized are financially compensated for exclusion (Lelieveld, Gunther Moor, Crone, 
Karremans, & van Beest, 2013) or when being excluded is consistent with social norms 
(Rudert & Greifeneder, 2016). Moreover, visualizing oneself in a powerful position alleviates 
the impact of ostracism on negative affect and the need for control, thereby reducing 
aggressive retaliation against perpetrators of social exclusion (Schoel, Eck, & Greifeneder, 
2014). Because ostracism can result in various detrimental coping behaviors (e.g., aggression 
or social isolation; Schoel et al., 2014; Williams, 2009), research on ways to mitigate the 
impact of ostracism on basic needs is highly relevant.  
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Extending this recent research on mitigating circumstances, the present work 
introduces belonging to a majority as a potential buffer against the immediate threat ostracism 
poses to the basic needs. Building on research into social groups (e.g., Moscovici, 1980; 
Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 1991), we propose that majorities to which one belongs possess the 
potential to protect basic needs. Because group memberships are especially important to 
individuals with a high need to belong (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2013), we 
further hypothesized that membership in a majority should buffer especially those individuals 
with a high need to belong against need threat from ostracism. We next present a derivation of 
these hypotheses from the literature. 
Majority groups’ potential to protect basic needs 
Most of the literature on social groups defines majorities versus minorities according 
to numerical size, social power, and/or status (e.g., Erb, Bohner, Hewstone, Werth, & 
Reinhard, 2006; Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990; Ng, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 1991). 
While majorities are always greater in size than minorities, they do not necessarily have 
greater social power or higher status (Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990). Nonetheless, individuals 
generally assume the way the majority thinks, judges, and behaves to be better or more likely 
to be correct, whereas the way the minority thinks, judges, and behaves is assumed to be 
worse or more likely to be wrong (Kruglanski & Mackie, 1990; Moscovici, 1980; Sachdev & 
Bourhis, 1984). These associations are likely the result of the high consensus reflected in the 
numerical size of majorities and the low consensus reflected in the numerical size of 
minorities. High consensus means that many individuals share a characteristic or opinion with 
each other. By sharing a characteristic or opinion with many others, individuals feel validated. 
Moreover, many decisions are based on high consensus, resulting in associations of majorities 
with high power and recognition. In addition, high consensus is associated with security 
because consequences of an individual’s decision are less extreme when shared with a 
majority than a minority (Erb, Hilton, Bohner, & Roffey, 2015). Building on these common 
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associations of majorities, we assumed that perceiving oneself as a member of a majority has 
the potential to boost one’s sense of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful 
existence. Below we elaborate on each aspect.  
Belonging 
First, majority groups facilitate feelings of belonging because they comprise many 
people with whom one may feel connected through shared characteristics or opinions. 
Research with the minimal group paradigm has repeatedly demonstrated that ostensibly 
shared characteristics or opinions, for example, in estimation behavior or aesthetic 
preferences, are sufficient for perceiving others as in-group members (e.g., Petersen & Blank, 
2003; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). The in-group in turn can serve as a social 
resource for the individual and bolster a sense of belonging (Correll & Park, 2005). Building 
on these findings, we propose that a numerical majority constitutes a larger social resource 
than smaller groups. Moreover, knowing that there are many “standing behind oneself” can 
provide enhanced security and help maintain a satisfactory level of belonging. 
Self-esteem 
Knowing that there are many “standing behind oneself” may also contribute to 
maintaining a reasonably high self-esteem because the self-esteem system can be understood 
as a sociometer that mirrors a person’s inclusionary status (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 
1995). Moreover, when membership in a particular social group is activated, the most salient 
attributes of group members’ self-concept are likely those that are representative of that group 
(Hogg & Turner, 1987; Smith & Henry, 1996). In this way, majority groups’ frequent 
associations with positive attributes such as good, right, secure, and privileged (cf. Kruglanski 
& Mackie, 1990; Moscovici, 1980; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 1991) can contribute to the 
positive self-esteem of their members when group membership is salient. Given that majority 
groups provide consensual validation from many similar others, thereby increasing certainty 
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in one’s characteristics or opinions, we presume that their members’ high self-esteem is 
bolstered to a great degree. 
Control 
In addition, majority groups are often associated with high power (e.g., Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; Ng, 1982; see Lücken & Simon, 2005, for empirical evidence). 
High power individuals in turn have been found to perceive that they have greater control 
over resources, even when that control is illusory (e.g., when events are largely dependent on 
chance; Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009). Moreover, there is empirical support 
for a direct majority-control link (Guinote, Brown, & Fiske, 2006). Guinote et al. (2006) 
manipulated group membership via feedback on a perception task and found that majority 
members perceived greater control over their behavior and outcomes than did minority 
members. As a result, one may presume that majority members’ elevated sense of control can 
help them to maintain their perceived control over the social environment at a reasonably high 
level. 
Meaningful existence 
Finally, majority groups can also fulfill their members’ need for being recognized as 
existing and being worthy of attention. As reflected in the emphasis on majority rule in many 
western countries’ democracies (Lijphart, 1984), majorities play an important role in society. 
Because of their great societal influence, majority groups are often the center of attention. 
Moreover, because of the high intercorrelation of the four basic needs, majorities can fulfill 
the need for meaningful existence indirectly by enhancing their members’ sense of belonging 
and control, as well as their self-esteem. Together these aspects provide majority groups with 
a strong potential to protect the need for meaningful existence. Note that we do not question 
other types of groups’ potential to bolster meaningful existence, too (see also General 
Discussion). 
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To summarize, majority groups possess the potential to fulfill basic needs, helping 
their members to maintain a satisfactory need state. However, the desire to belong to the 
majority is moderated by both personality traits, such as agency or the need for uniqueness, 
and situationally aroused drives for assimilation and differentiation (Brewer, 1991; Gebauer, 
Paulhus, & Neberich, 2013; Imhoff & Erb, 2009). We do not expect that the common 
associations of majorities are reversed for people striving for differentiation but that people 
striving for differentiation identify less with majorities. By investigating need to belong as a 
potential moderator, we test the hypothesis that belonging to a majority would meet the basic 
needs of individuals according to the extent to which they place importance on group 
memberships in general. 
The role of the need to belong 
According to Baumeister and Leary (1995) the “need to belong is a fundamental 
human motivation” (p. 497), and if it is not satisfied, negative effects on health and well-being 
will result. Leary et al. (2013) further suggested that individuals differ in their striving for 
acceptance by other people and their desire for belonging to social groups. While individuals 
with a high need to belong (high NTBs) seek many relationships and are concerned about 
being accepted by others, individuals with a low need to belong (low NTBs) strive for 
relationships with only a few others and do not worry about acceptance except by those few 
(Leary & Kelly, 2009; Leary et al., 2013). High versus low NTBs have been found to show 
greater cooperation in large groups (DeCremer & Leonardelli, 2003) and greater sensitivity to 
social cues (Pickett, Gardner, and Knowles, 2004), presumably because both cooperation and 
sensitivity to social cues may help foster acceptance by others. 
Most important for this study, however, is the finding that high and low NTBs differ in 
the importance they place on social aspects of their identities (Leary et al., 2013, Study 6). In 
general, individuals differ in the degree to which they typically construe their selves as 
individuated and personal (i.e., emphasizing individual characteristics and internal states) or 
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relational and social (i.e., emphasizing interpersonal characteristics, relationships, social 
groups, statuses, and roles; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994). Given that high NTBs 
have a strong desire for acceptance and belonging, their social self-concept, including both 
their interpersonal relationships and social groups, should be especially important to them. 
Correspondingly, Leary et al. (2013) reported a positive correlation between need to belong 
and importance placed on social identity, but no relationship between need to belong and 
importance placed on personal identity. Building on this evidence, we hypothesized that high 
NTBs would be more likely than low NTBs to benefit from belonging to a majority as a 
buffer against ostracism’s immediate impact on basic needs. 
In sum, this work investigates whether perceiving oneself as a member of a majority 
reduces the immediate effects of ostracism on basic needs according to one’s dispositional 
need to belong. In three studies, group membership was manipulated prior to social inclusion 
versus exclusion. Study 1 compared membership in a majority group and in a group of 
unknown size with membership in a minority group. Study 2 compared membership in a 
majority group and in a group of unknown size with a control condition without group 
assignment (no-group condition). Finally, Study 3 compared membership in a majority group 
and in a minority group with the no-group condition. The group of unknown size was 
included to substantiate our reasoning that not just any social group but a majority group in 
particular possesses the potential to reduce immediate social exclusion effects. 
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to gather first evidence for our hypothesis that perceiving 
oneself as a member of a majority can reduce the impact of ostracism on basic needs for high 
but not for low NTBs. To this end, we assigned participants to a majority group, a minority 
group, or a group of unknown size. We expected that high NTBs in the majority group would 
show less need threat than those in the minority group. By contrast, high NTBs in the group of 
unknown size and high NTBs in the minority group should not differ in their need threat. 
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Finally, low NTBs should be hardly affected by group membership but respond to ostracism 
with less need threat than high NTBs. 
In addition to affecting need threat, being ostracized has also been shown to increase 
negative affect (e.g., Williams et al., 2000). Except for one study on minority groups (Lücken 
& Simon, 2005), there is no research directly testing the affective experiences of members of 
a numerical majority versus members of other groups. In that study, members of a minority 
reported less positive affect than members of a majority, unless the minority members 
perceived themselves as powerful. However, because there was no control group, it is unclear 
whether belonging to a majority increases positive affect or belonging to a minority decreases 
it. We therefore measured participants’ mood but refrained from specifying a direct ex ante 
hypothesis regarding the buffering effect of membership in a majority on mood. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were recruited from the online pool of a 
German university and randomly assigned to a 2 (social experience: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 
3 (group: majority vs. minority vs. unknown group size) between-participants factorial design. 
One hundred and fifteen participants completed the entire online study, but eight participants 
did not answer the manipulation check for social experience or group correctly (see below); 
their data were therefore excluded from analyses, which resulted in a sample size of 107 (73% 
females; 78% students; Mage = 25.9, SD = 7.7). 
Procedure and materials. After agreeing to informed consent, participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three group conditions. 
Group manipulation. In order to manipulate group membership, participants first 
completed a perception task (procedure adapted from Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996), in 
which they were consecutively shown four pictures for 3 s each. In each picture, different 
numbers of small and large dots were presented, which participants were asked to estimate. 
Subsequently, all participants were told that their dot estimates indicated they were more 
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focused on the small dots, implying that they belonged to the group of detailed perceivers 
who tend to focus on specifics (versus global perceivers who tend to focus on overall 
structure). Additionally, participants in the majority condition were told, "Compared with 
global perceivers, detailed perceivers constitute a majority in the general population. In our 
studies as well, 86.8% of previous participants were detailed perceivers." Participants in the 
minority condition were told, "Compared with global perceivers, detailed perceivers 
constitute a minority in the general population. In our studies as well, merely 13.2% of 
previous participants were detailed perceivers." Participants in the unknown group size 
condition received no further information about the percentage of detailed perceivers in the 
general population.1 
Social experience manipulation: My Graduating Class. Given that manipulating 
social experience by means of scenarios is an established practice in the ostracism literature 
(e.g., Aydin, Fischer, & Frey, 2010; Hitlan, Kelly, Schepman, Schneider, & Zárate, 2006; 
Wirth, 2016), we induced social inclusion versus exclusion by a newly developed and 
pretested scenario. Participants were asked to imagine that they were members in an online 
social network offering the possibility of joining several virtual groups. Joining groups was 
described as being useful in getting to know members with similar interests or in 
communicating with people with whom they had something in common, such as the same 
school. Participants were then told that they found a group of their graduating class that nearly 
all of their former school fellows belonged to. They were further asked to imagine that they 
wanted to join the group, too, as they had long wished to have more contact with their 
graduating class. We manipulated social experience by stating that group membership was 
either granted or denied. Specifically, participants in the inclusion condition were told, "Your 
membership request was accepted immediately as your former schoolfellows want you to be 
in their group very much." By contrast, participants in the exclusion condition were told, 
"You sent your membership request more than a week ago and you have not been accepted by 
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the group yet, although both group founders are apparently active in the online social 
network. Obviously, your former school fellows do not want you to be in their group." 
Participants in both groups were asked to imagine themselves in the respective situation and 
to write down their thoughts and feelings.2 
Dependent variables. After completing the social experience manipulation, 
participants rated their mood (bad-good; negative-positive; unpleasant-pleasant; α = .97; 
scales from 1 to 9) and stated the degree of threat they experienced to their need for 
belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence on 16 items (e.g., “I feel like an 
outsider”; “I feel powerless”; scales from 1 = not true to 9 = true; adapted from Williams, 
2009). Although they are conceptually separable constructs, it seems reasonable to assume 
some overlap in the four basic needs (Williams, 2009). In line with this assumption, these 
needs are generally combined into a single need satisfaction or need threat index with high 
internal consistency (α > .90) when similar immediate effects on the needs are expected (e.g., 
Lelieveld et al., 2013; Teng & Chen, 2012; van Beest, & Williams, 2006; Zadro, Boland, & 
Richardson, 2006).3 Because we expect similar effects on all four needs, we follow this 
tradition and report an overall need threat index (α = .94; but see Table 1 for the relevant 
results separately for the four needs). Items were (re-)coded such that higher values indicate 
greater need threat.  
Need to belong. As a moderator, need to belong was measured with the German 
version of Leary et al.’s (2013) Need to Belong Scale by Hartung and Renner (2014; 10 items; 
e.g., “I have a strong need to belong”; α = .79; scales from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree). Need to belong was not significantly affected by the group manipulation or 
the social experience manipulation (all ps > .127).4 
Manipulation checks. As a manipulation check for group, participants in the majority 
and minority conditions were asked whether they belonged to the majority or minority of 
participants regarding their assigned perception group (1 = majority; 2 = minority; 3 = I don’t 
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know). As a manipulation check for social experience, participants were asked whether or not 
they were included by the group of their former classmates in the scenario described (1 = yes; 
2 = no). 
Finally, we collected standard demographic information and assessed control variables 
such as participants’ assumptions about the investigated research question (no correct 
guesses). The study closed with a debriefing in which participants were informed that the 
feedback on their perception performance had no informative value and that it was random for 
experimental reasons. Participants were further debriefed that this proceeding allowed us to 
investigate effects of belonging to a majority or minority.    
Results 
Manipulation checks. Regarding the manipulation check for group, one participant in 
the majority condition incorrectly indicated belonging to the minority, and two participants in 
the minority condition indicated belonging to the majority or not knowing whether they 
belonged to the majority or minority. Moreover, five participants (one in the majority 
condition, one in the minority condition, and three in the unknown group size condition) 
indicated that they imagined being included by the group of their former classmates although 
they were in the exclusion condition. The data of these eight participants were excluded from 
analyses. 
Need threat index. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on the need threat 
index including dummy-coded social experience (0 = inclusion, 1 = exclusion), dummy-coded 
group with the minority condition as reference group (0 = minority/unknown group size, 1 = 
majority; and 0 = minority/majority, 1 = unknown group size), and need to belong as a 
continuous variable (mean-centered) in Step 1, the two-way interactions in Step 2, and the 
three-way interactions in Step 3. 
In Step 1, F(4, 102) = 6.65, p < .001, f2 = .26, both social experience, β = .29, t(102) = 
3.23, p = .002, and need to belong, β = .27, t(102) = 3.02, p = .003, significantly predicted 
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need threat, indicating that need threat was greater in conditions of exclusion and with 
increasing need to belong. Moreover, in Step 2, ∆F(5, 97) = 2.03, p = .082, f2 = .10, a 
significant Social Experience x Need to Belong interaction was observed, β = .30, t(97) = 
2.80, p = .006. Simple slopes analyses revealed a nonsignificant effect of social experience for 
low NTBs (-1 SD), β = .12, ItI < 1. By contrast, for high NTBs (+ 1 SD) need threat was 
greater under exclusion than inclusion, β = .68, t(97) = 3.91, p < .001. More important, in Step 
3, ∆F(2, 95) = 4.30, p = .016, f2 = .09, a significant Social Experience x Need to Belong x 
Group (minority vs. majority) interaction, β = -.33, t(95) = -2.78, p = .007, and a significant 
Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (minority vs. unknown group size) interaction, β 
= -.31, t(95) = -2.01, p = .047, occurred. 
Simple slopes analyses revealed that low NTBs (- 1 SD) were unaffected by exclusion 
in all three group conditions (all ps > .253). As expected, high NTBs (+ 1 SD), however, 
experienced greater need threat under exclusion than inclusion when belonging to a minority, 
β = .94, t(95) = 4.87, p < .001, and in tendency when belonging to a group of unknown size , 
β = .38, t(95) = 1.66, p = .101, but showed no social exclusion effect when belonging to a 
majority, β = .11, ItI < 1. Point estimates are depicted in Figure 1. All other main and 
interaction effects were nonsignificant (all ps > .114). The statistics of the three-way 
interactions separately for the four needs are displayed in Table 1. 
Mood. The same hierarchical regression analysis on mood revealed in Step 1, F(4, 
102) = 5.94, p < .001, f2 = .23, a significant main effect of social experience, β = -.38, t(102) = 
-4.23, p < .001 , indicating worse mood in conditions of exclusion than inclusion. Also, in 
Step 2, ∆F(5, 97) = 1.53, p = .187, f2 = .08, a significant Social Experience x Need to Belong 
interaction was observed, β = -.22, t(97) = -1.99, p = .050. Simple slopes analyses revealed—
as with need threat—that the simple slope for low NTBs (- 1 SD) was nonsignificant, β = -.12, 
ItI < 1, whereas for high NTBs (+ 1 SD) mood was worse under exclusion than inclusion, β = -
.52, t(97) = -2.94, p = .004. In addition, the Group (minority vs. unknown group size) x Need 
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to Belong interaction was significant, β = .24, t(97) = 2.07, p = .041.5 All other main and 
interaction effects were nonsignificant (all ps > .152). 
Discussion 
Study 1 provides first support for the hypothesis that high NTBs can be buffered 
against the negative impact of ostracism on basic needs when belonging to a majority group. 
By contrast, high NTBs in both the minority condition and unknown group size condition 
showed the well-known social exclusion effect on basic needs. However, the effect was 
significantly smaller for high NTBs in the unknown group size condition than for high NTBs 
in the minority condition. Because Study 1 did not include a control condition without group 
assignment, both a reduced need threat for high NTBs in the unknown group size condition 
and an increased need threat for high NTBs in the minority condition is conceivable. 
Although we predicted the social exclusion effect for low NTBs to be generally 
smaller than for high NTBs, its absence in all three group conditions was unexpected. To test 
whether this finding is contingent on the scenario manipulation chosen, Study 2 employed a 
different manipulation of social exclusion, namely Cyberball (Williams et al., 2000; Williams 
& Jarvis, 2006).  
Mood was worse under exclusion than inclusion for high but not for low NTBs. Of 
interest, in contrast with the effect on basic needs, ostracism’s impact on mood was not 
moderated by group membership for high NTBs. Thus, belonging to a majority reduced need 
threat but did not buffer against worse mood as a result of being ostracized, which seemed to 
remain an unpleasant experience.  
Study 2 
The goal of Study 2 was threefold: First, Study 2 aimed to extend the findings of 
Study 1 by employing Cyberball—a classic and widely used manipulation of social exclusion 
(Williams et al., 2000; Williams & Jarvis, 2006). Cyberball is a virtual ball-tossing game that 
participants ostensibly play with two other players over the internet, while, in fact, they are 
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playing against the computer. In the inclusion condition, tosses are evenly split between 
players, whereas in the exclusion condition, participants receive only two tosses at the 
beginning and are then ignored. 
Second, Study 2 sought to provide additional evidence that not just any social group 
but a majority group in particular can reduce the impact of ostracism on basic needs. To this 
end, we compared the majority condition and unknown group size condition with a control 
condition in which participants were assigned no group membership prior to the social 
experience manipulation (no-group condition). We predicted that high NTBs in the majority 
condition would show less need threat than those in the no-group condition. Moreover, we 
expected that high NTBs in the unknown group size condition and high NTBs in the no-group 
condition would not differ in their need threat. 
Third, Study 2 introduces the Actual-Desired Need State (ADNS) Scale as an 
alternative measure to Williams’s (2009) need threat items. The need threat items “measure 
how much belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence people are experiencing 
during Cyberball” (van Beest & Williams, 2006, p. 920) and thus are designed to reflect the 
level of basic needs. “As such, [they] only serve as a proxy of whether these needs are 
threatened” (van Beest & Williams, 2006, p. 920).  By contrast, the ADNS Scale is designed 
to assess deficits in basic needs by asking participants to what extent the actual need state 
differs from the desired one (e.g., for belonging: “I do not have as strong a sense of belonging 
as I would like”). From a theoretical perspective, this actual-desired comparison appears 
worthwhile because a need reflects the discrepancy between an actual state and a target or 
desired state (Blythe, 2013). Need fulfillment is achieved when the actual need state 
corresponds to the desired one; need threat is experienced to the extent to which the actual 
need state differs from the desired one.  
In a pretest with 41 participants, the ADNS Scale had high reliability (α = .95) and 
showed evidence of high convergent validity, being significantly affected by social inclusion 
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versus exclusion in Cyberball (Minclusion = 3.16, SD = 1.38, vs. Mexclusion = 4.53, SD = 1.30, on 
a scale from 1 to 7 with higher values indicating greater need threat), t(39) = 3.26, p = .002, d 
= 1.02, and being positively correlated with Williams’s (2009) need threat items, r = .87, p < 
.001.6 The 12-item ADNS Scale is reported in the Appendix. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and randomly assigned to a 2 (social experience: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 3 (group: majority 
vs. unknown group size vs. no-group) between-participants factorial design. We set 
participation requirements such that only individuals could participate (a) with a minimum 
approval rate on Amazon Mechanical Turk (95% or greater) and (b) who self-identified as 
U.S. residents, unacquainted with Cyberball, and aged between 18 and 30 years (see 
Hawkley, Williams, & Cacioppo, 2011, suggesting that need threat experienced in Cyberball 
decreases with increasing age). One hundred and forty-nine participants completed the entire 
online study (48% females; 44% students, one participant did not indicate student status; Mage 
= 25.3, SD = 3.3). 
Procedure and materials. Participants first gave their informed consent. Next, we 
collected standard demographic information and randomly assigned participants to one of the 
three group conditions. 
Group manipulation. Participants completed the same perception task as in Study 1. 
Participants in the majority and the unknown group size conditions received the feedback that 
they belonged to the group of detailed perceivers immediately after the perception task, 
whereas participants in the control condition without group assignment (no-group condition) 
were told that the evaluation of the estimation task would take a little time and received the 
feedback after completing the dependent variables. In addition, participants in the majority 
condition received the same information on group size as in Study 1. This time, however, the 
OSTRACISM, MAJORITY, NEED THREAT  17 
feedback was accompanied by a picture representing the majority group. To keep the group 
size salient, this picture was also present during the Cyberball game (see Figure 2a). 
Manipulation check for group. Participants in the majority condition were asked 
whether they, as a member of the detailed perceivers group, belonged to the minority or 
majority (1 = minority; 2 = majority). Only participants who answered the manipulation check 
for group correctly were allowed to continue the study.  
Social experience manipulation: Cyberball. Next, all participants played Cyberball 
with two other supposed players that were actually preprogrammed. In the inclusion 
condition, participants received the ball ten times out of thirty throws, whereas in the 
exclusion condition, participants got the ball only twice near the beginning of the game (cf. 
Williams et al., 2000). 
Dependent variables. Subsequent to the Cyberball game, participants completed the 
12-item ADNS Scale (α = .95; scales from 1 = not at all to 9 = very much) and a three-item 
measure of mood (same as in Study 1; α = .98; 9-point scales). Items were (re-)coded for 
analyses so that higher values indicate greater need threat (i.e., a greater difference between 
the actual and the desired need state). 
Estimation of group size. To be able to test our assumption that participants in the 
unknown group size condition would think of a smaller group than those in the majority 
condition, we asked all participants to estimate the percentage of the general population 
belonging to the group of detailed perceivers. 
Manipulation check for social experience. As manipulation check for social 
experience, participants were asked to estimate the number of received throws during 
Cyberball (cf. Williams et al., 2000). 
Need to belong. As a moderator, need to belong was measured with the Need to 
Belong Scale (Leary et al., 2013; 10 items; α = .86; scales from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
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strongly agree). Need to belong was not significantly affected by the group manipulation or 
the social experience manipulation (all Fs < 1). 
Finally, we assessed control variables such as participants’ assumptions about the 
investigated research question (no correct guesses). The study closed with a debriefing in 
which participants were informed that they had played Cyberball not with other participants 
but with the computer, that the computer had followed a highly detailed script, and that the 
course of the game—in particular whether they received few or many balls—had nothing to 
do with them as a person. The debriefing with regard to the group manipulation was the same 
as in Study 1.  
Results 
Estimation of group size. Attesting to the group manipulation’s success, participants’ 
estimates of group size were significantly higher in the majority condition (80.9%, SD = 13.8) 
than in the unknown group size condition (M = 42.2%, SD = 14.8), t(146) = 12.56, p < .001, d 
= 2.70, and the no-group condition (M = 41.6%, SD = 16.8), t(146) = 12.77, p < .001, d = 
2.55. Moreover, participants in the unknown group size and no-group conditions did not differ 
significantly in their estimates, ItI < 1; participants in both conditions estimated that detailed 
perceivers were slightly less represented in the general population than were global 
perceivers. 
Manipulation check for social experience. A 2 (social experience: included vs. 
excluded) x 3 (group: majority vs. unknown group size vs. no-group) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on the manipulation check for social experience confirmed that participants in the 
exclusion condition reported fewer received throws (M = 9.70, SD = 8.69) than those in the 
inclusion condition (M = 36.68, SD = 12.96), F(1, 143) = 220.39, p < .001, ηp² = .61 (all other 
ps > .355). 
ADNS Scale. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on the ADNS Scale 
including dummy-coded social experience (0 = inclusion, 1 = exclusion), dummy-coded 
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group with the no-group condition as reference group (0 = no-group/unknown group size, 1 = 
majority; and 0 = no-group/majority, 1 = unknown group size), and need to belong as 
continuous variable (mean-centered) in Step 1, the two-way interactions in Step 2, and the 
three-way interactions in Step 3. 
In Step 1, F(4, 144) = 24.80, p < .001, f2 = .69, both social experience, β = .44, t(144) 
= 6.78, p < .001, and need to belong, β = .43, t(144) = 6.59, p, < .001, significantly predicted 
need threat, indicating that need threat was greater in conditions of exclusion and with 
increasing need to belong. Moreover, in Step 3, ∆F(2, 137) = 2.51, p = .085, f2 = .04, the 
predicted Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-group vs. majority) interaction 
emerged only as a nonsignificant trend, β = -.23, t(137) = -1.68, p = .095. Simple slopes 
analyses revealed that low NTBs (- 1 SD) experienced greater need threat under exclusion 
than inclusion in both the no-group condition, β = .40, t(137) = 2.74, p = .007, and the 
majority condition, β = .60, t(137) = 3.07, p = .003. More important, high NTBs (+ 1 SD) 
experienced greater need threat under exclusion than inclusion in the no-group condition, β = 
.64, t(137) = 4.11, p < .001, whereas in the majority condition the simple effect of social 
experience was nonsignificant, β = .26, t(137) = 1.54, p = .125. Point estimates are depicted in 
Figure 3. 
As expected, the Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-group vs. unknown 
group size) interaction was nonsignificant, β = .08, ItI < 1. The social exclusion effect on the 
ADNS Scale for high NTBs in the unknown group size condition was significant, β = .62, 
t(137) = 4.06, p < .001, and comparable to that for high NTBs in the no-group condition (see 
above). All other main and interaction effects were nonsignificant (all ps > .093). The 
statistics of the three-way interactions separately for the four needs are displayed in Table 1. 
Mood. The same hierarchical regression analysis on mood revealed that in Step 1, F(4, 
144) = 17.84, p < .001, f2 = .50, both social experience, β = -.44, t(144) = -6.42, p < .001, and 
need to belong, β = -.32, t(144) = -4.59, p < .001, significantly predicted mood, indicating 
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worse mood in conditions of exclusion and with increasing need to belong. As in Study 1, a 
significant Social Experience x Need to Belong interaction, β = -.24, t(139) = -2.35, p = .020, 
was observed in Step 2, ∆F(5, 139) = 1.59, p = .166, f2 = .06. Simple slopes analyses revealed 
that mood was worse under exclusion than inclusion for both low NTBs (- 1 SD), β = -.36, 
t(139) = -2.76, p = .007, and high NTBs (+ 1 SD), β = -.69, t(139) = -4.99, p < .001, but the 
social exclusion effect was smaller for low NTBs. All other main and interaction effects were 
nonsignificant (all ps > .191). 
Discussion 
Employing the newly developed ADNS Scale, Study 2 replicated the finding that high 
NTBs in the majority condition were buffered against the social exclusion effect on basic 
needs, whereas high NTBs in the unknown group size condition and the no-group condition 
showed the well-known social exclusion effect. The results suggest that merely belonging to 
some social group with undetermined group size is not sufficient to provide high NTBs with 
the necessary resources to attenuate need threat from ostracism. The social exclusion effect on 
mood was smaller for low NTBs than high NTBs. As in Study 1, there was no significant 
moderating effect of group membership, indicating that ostracism remained an unpleasant 
experience worsening mood regardless of belonging to the majority or not. 
We note that the predicted Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-group vs. 
majority) interaction failed to reach conventional levels of significance, perhaps reflecting 
that the group manipulation was not very captivating. Replicating the three-way interaction in 
Study 3 therefore appeared desirable. We also note that a critical aspect of the Cyberball 
operationalization may be that the picture symbolizing the majority was shown to players in 
the majority condition, but no picture was shown to players in the other conditions, which 
produced a confound. For instance, one could argue that the picture in the majority condition 
distracted participants, and that this distraction—and not belonging to the majority—might 
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have reduced need threat. Although this alternative explanation would not hold for the 
findings observed in Study 1, we experimentally addressed it in Study 3.  
Study 3 
Beyond replicating and extending the findings of Studies 1 and 2 by employing a new 
group manipulation, Study 3 followed three major goals. First, Study 3 sought to substantiate 
the empirical evidence collected in Study 2 by demonstrating that the reduced need threat for 
high NTBs in the majority condition cannot be attributed to mere distraction by the picture 
shown during Cyberball. Second, Study 3 tested the associations between majority groups and 
the attributes we assumed to contribute to majority groups’ potential to protect their members’ 
basic needs. Third, because Study 1 did not include a control condition without group 
assignment, it did not allow for drawing conclusions about the extent to which belonging to a 
minority affects need threat. To address this question, a no-group condition was added in 
Study 3. We predicted that high NTBs in the majority condition would show lower need 
threat than those in the no-group condition. Moreover, we expected that high NTBs in the 
minority condition and high NTBs in the no-group condition would not differ in their need 
threat. 
Method 
Participants and design. Participants were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk 
and randomly assigned to a 2 (social experience: inclusion vs. exclusion) x 3 (group: majority 
vs. minority vs. no-group) between-participants factorial design. Prespecified participation 
requirements were the same as in Study 2. Two hundred and four participants completed the 
entire online study. Despite the predefined requirements, five participants later indicated to 
know Cyberball, and three participants did not answer the manipulation check for group 
correctly;7 these participants’ data were excluded from analyses. The resulting sample size 
included 196 participants (55% females, one participant did not indicate gender; 32% 
students; Mage = 26.3, SD = 3.1). 
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Procedure and materials. We used the same procedure and materials as in Study 2 
except for the following changes. First, we used a new group manipulation. Given that U.S. 
voters were in the middle of primaries and caucuses for the presidential election 2016 during 
data collection, we asked participants to imagine that it was the day of election, and that they 
were on-site at an election party when the first projection was announced. To induce 
participants to see themselves as members of a majority (minority), they were further asked to 
imagine that 82% (18%) of the voters had supported the same candidate as they did. 
Participants were then asked to write about their thoughts and emotions in response to the 
majority (minority) situation. Participants in the no-group condition were directly led to the 
Cyberball game without completing a writing task.  
Second, for all participants in all conditions a picture was displayed below their 
Cyberball player. The picture representing the majority (Figure 2a) or minority (Figure 2b) 
had already been introduced during the completion of the group manipulation. The picture in 
the no-group condition (Figure 2c) was introduced at the onset of Cyberball and was of 
similar size as the one in the majority condition. To the extent that the results of Study 2 were 
due to distraction by the picture shown in the majority condition, no differential effects across 
the group conditions should be observed in Study 3.  
Third, as a manipulation check for group, participants in the majority and minority 
conditions were asked to indicate the group to which they belonged with regard to their 
candidate preference (1 = minority; 2 = majority). 
Fourth, after completing the dependent variables, participants in the majority and 
minority conditions were asked to indicate their feelings when they learned that they belonged 
to the majority or minority (same 3 items as mood measure; α = .98) and the extent to which 
they associated specific attributes with a majority or minority group, that is, attributes we 
assumed to contribute to the buffering effect of majority groups (6 items; e.g., “contributes to 
a positive self-esteem of its members”; “gives its members a sense of being visible in the 
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society”; α = .95; scales from 1 = not at all to 9 = very much). Participants in the no-group 
condition first indicated their associations between the attributes and majority or minority 
groups in general and were then provided with both versions of the election scenario and 
asked to indicate how they would feel in the respective majority or minority situation. 
As a final change compared to Studies 1 and 2, need to belong was assessed at the 
study’s beginning (and not end). To prevent effects of scale assessment on subsequent 
manipulations, the Need to Belong Scale (Leary et al., 2013; α = .85) was embedded between 
two unrelated questionnaires (Life Orientation Test; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale; Brown & Ryan, 2003).  
Results 
Manipulation check for social experience. A 2 (social experience: included vs. 
excluded) x 3 (group: majority vs. minority vs. no-group) ANOVA on the manipulation check 
for social experience confirmed that participants in the exclusion condition reported fewer 
received throws (M = 8.34, SD = 6.43) than those in the inclusion condition (M = 37.71, SD = 
13.60), F(1, 190) = 371.60, p < .001, ηp² = .66 (all other Fs < 1). 
ADNS Scale. We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on the ADNS Scale (α 
= .95) including dummy-coded social experience (0 = inclusion, 1 = exclusion), dummy-
coded group with the no-group condition as reference group (0 = no-group/minority, 1 = 
majority; and 0 = no-group/majority, 1 = minority), and need to belong as continuous variable 
(mean-centered) in Step 1, the two-way interactions in Step 2, and the three-way interactions 
in Step 3. 
In Step 1, F(4, 191) = 15.58, p < .001, f2 = .33, both social experience, β = .34, t(191) 
= 5.33, p < .001, and need to belong, β = .33, t(191) = 5.13, p < .001, significantly predicted 
need threat, indicating that need threat was greater in conditions of exclusion and with 
increasing need to belong. Moreover, in Step 3, ∆F(2, 184) = 1.87, p = .157, f2 = .02, the 
predicted Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-group vs. majority) interaction 
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emerged as a nonsignificant trend, β = -.24, t(184) = -1.82, p = .071. Simple slopes analyses 
revealed that low NTBs (- 1 SD) experienced greater need threat under exclusion than 
inclusion in the majority condition, β = .53, t(184) = 2.94, p = .004, but not in the no-group 
condition, β = .09, |t| < 1. More important, high NTBs (+ 1 SD) experienced greater need 
threat under exclusion than inclusion in the no-group condition, β = .42, t(184) = 2.62, p = 
.010, whereas in the majority condition the effect was nonsignificant, β = .25, t(184) = 1.62, p 
= .108. Point estimates are depicted in Figure 4. 
As expected, the Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-group vs. minority) 
interaction was nonsignificant, β = -.05, ItI < 1. The social exclusion effect on the ADNS 
Scale for high NTBs in the minority condition was significant, β = .53, t(184) = 2.85, p = 
.005, and similarly large as that for high NTBs in the no-group condition (see above). All 
other main and interaction effects were nonsignificant (all ps > .346). The statistics of the 
three-way interactions separately for the four needs are displayed in Table 1. 
Mood. The same hierarchical regression analysis on mood (α = .98) revealed that in 
Step 1, F(4, 191) = 12.88, p < .001, f2 = .27, both social experience, β = -.36, t(191) = -5.62, p 
< .001, and need to belong, β = -.24, t(191) = -3.67, p < .001, significantly predicted mood, 
indicating worse mood in conditions of exclusion and with increasing need to belong. In Step 
3, ∆F(2, 184) = 2.81, p = .063, f2 = .03, these main effects were qualified by a significant 
Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-group vs. majority) interaction, β = .30, 
t(184) = 2.25, p = .026. Simple slopes analyses revealed that low NTBs (- 1 SD) experienced 
worse mood under exclusion than inclusion in the majority condition, β = -.71, t(184) = -3.89, 
p < .001, whereas in the no-group condition the effect was nonsignificant, β = -.21, t(184) = -
1.33, p = .185. More important, high NTBs (+ 1 SD) experienced worse mood under 
exclusion than inclusion in the no-group condition, β = -.41, t(184) = -2.50, p = .013, but not 
in the majority condition, β = -.13, ItI < 1. All other main and interaction effects were 
nonsignificant (all ps > .197). 
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Attributes and feelings associated with group membership. For participants in the 
majority and minority conditions, the hierarchical regression analysis on the attributes 
associated with group membership revealed in Step 1, F(3, 128) = 67.44, p < .001, f2 = 1.58, a 
significant main effect of group (0 = minority; 1 = majority), β = .77, t(128) = 13.84, p < .001, 
indicating stronger associations of the attributes with a majority group than a minority group. 
All other main and interaction effects were nonsignificant (all ps > .263).  
The same hierarchical regression analysis on the feelings associated with group 
membership also revealed in Step 1, F(3, 128) = 86.34, p < .001, f2 = 2.02, a significant main 
effect of group, β = .83, t(128) = 16.05, p < .001, indicating more positive feelings associated 
with belonging to the majority than belonging to the minority. Moreover, a nonsignificant 
trend of need to belong, β = -.10, t(128) = -1.89, p = .061, indicates a tendency of more 
positive feelings with decreasing need to belong regardless of group membership. All other 
main and interaction effects were nonsignificant (all ps > .098). 
No-group participants evaluated attributes before having read the election scenarios. 
Again, the attributes were more strongly associated with majority groups (M = 7.07, SD = 
1.38) than minority groups (M = 4.64, SD = 1.90), F(1, 63) = 74.10, p < .001, η² = .54. This 
finding allows for the conclusion that the associations with the majority observed in the 
present study may be general and are not limited to the specific manipulation we used. 
Moreover, after reading the election scenarios also no-group participants reported more 
positive feelings associated with belonging to a majority (M = 7.93, SD = 1.24) than 
belonging to a minority (M = 3.76, SD = 1.75), F(1, 63) = 191.84, p < .001, η² = .75.  
Discussion 
Study 3 replicated the finding that high NTBs in the majority condition were buffered 
against the social exclusion effect on basic needs, while high NTBs in the minority condition 
and the no-group condition showed the well-known social exclusion effect. Moreover, Study 
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3 attested to the hypothesized associations between majority groups and the attributes 
assumed to contribute to majorities’ potential to buffer against need threat.  
Other than in Studies 1 and 2, in Study 3 high NTBs in the majority condition were 
also buffered against ostracism’s negative impact on mood. Perhaps this is because the 
election scenario in Study 3 was richer in affect than the more neutral group manipulation 
employed in Studies 1 and 2. On a speculative note, one may thus conclude that high NTBs 
can also be buffered against the negative impact of ostracism on mood when belonging to the 
majority is associated with strong positive feelings. However, the affect-rich election scenario 
also comes with the downside of a potential confound: belonging to the majority and having 
success went together. Two considerations are important. First, what unites Studies 1 to 3 is 
the variation of group status, and not success. Second, high versus low NTBs tended to report 
fewer positive feelings associated with group membership, suggesting that the moderating 
effect found for high NTBs in the majority condition is hard to explain by affect only.  
As in Studies 1 and 2, need to belong positively predicted need threat. It is therefore 
hardly surprising that low NTBs have not been universally affected by the social experience 
manipulation. Specifically, low NTBs did not show an ostracism effect in any of the group 
conditions of Study 1 and in the no-group condition of Study 3. This finding suggests that low 
NTBs do not feel as threatened by experiences of social exclusion as do high NTBs. 
We note that the predicted Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-group vs. 
majority) interaction again failed to reach conventional levels of significance. To test the 
predicted three-way interaction with more statistical power, we conducted a small-scale meta-
analysis (Cumming, 2014) with the results of Studies 2 and 3. To this end, we transformed the 
standardized estimates of the predicted Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (no-
group vs. majority) interaction of Studies 2 and 3 into a Fisher’s z-score (Rosenthal & Rubin, 
1982) and weighted those z-scores by their sample’s inverse variance weight (i.e., n - 3; 
Hedges & Olkin, 1985). Back-transforming the resultant omnibus z-score into a standardized 
OSTRACISM, MAJORITY, NEED THREAT  27 
measure revealed a significant effect, β = -.24, 95% CI [-.33, -.13]. In the aggregate, therefore, 
the predicted three-way interaction proved significant, supporting our hypothesis that 
belonging to a majority reduces the immediate need threat from ostracism in high NTBs. 
In Study 3, a picture was displayed below the Cyberball player of all participants in all 
conditions. While this choice helped address the alternative distraction explanation to Study 2, 
it harbors a confound between the manipulation of social inclusion versus exclusion and the 
group manipulation. We have accepted this confound following the general practice in 
Cyberball studies, which often rely on pictures or colors to make different group memberships 
of the participant and/or the other players salient (e.g., Bernstein, Sacco, Young, Hugenberg, 
& Cook, 2010; Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007; Goodwin, Williams, & Carter-Sowell, 2010; 
Sacco, Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2014; Wirth & Williams, 2009). Despite being 
general practice, or perhaps for that very reason, future research may fruitfully resolve this 
methodological confound. 
General Discussion 
A common finding is that ostracism both threatens basic needs for belonging, self-
esteem, control, and meaningful existence, and increases negative affect (e.g., Williams et al., 
2000; Zadro et al., 2004). To date, very few moderators have been identified that lessen these 
immediate negative consequences of ostracism (for a recent overview, see Eck et al., 2016). 
The present studies propose belonging to a majority as a potential buffer against need threat. 
This is because majority groups provide a sense of belonging, can contribute to the high self-
esteem of their members, and give members a feeling of being in control over their social 
environment as well as being recognized as existing. Yet, not all individuals value group 
memberships in similar ways, with high NTBs placing greater importance on being part of 
groups than do low NTBs. Accordingly, the buffering effect of belonging to the majority 
should be restricted to high NTBs.  
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In line with this reasoning, the present studies show that belonging to a majority 
group, but not to a minority group or a group of unknown size, reduces the social exclusion 
effect on basic needs for high NTBs. By contrast, the reactions of low NTBs were not 
consistently affected by group membership. These findings replicated across different 
manipulations of social exclusion and group membership, different measures of need threat, 
and two cultural settings—one German and two U.S. samples. Furthermore, except for Study 
3, belonging to a majority group did not buffer against ostracism’s negative impact on mood. 
More often than not, ostracism seems to remain an unpleasant experience even when needs 
are not significantly threatened. 
That the buffering effect of belonging to a majority was observed only for high NTBs 
allows for the interesting speculation that belonging to the majority needs to be desired to be 
effective. Thus, individuals high in agency or in the need for uniqueness, who do not want to 
belong to majorities, may not benefit from belonging to a majority. Moreover, as people 
usually belong to several majorities and minorities, a specific group membership likely has to 
be salient to influence thoughts, feelings, or behaviors (cf. Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984). An 
interesting finding is that we observed majority effects even with a criterion as irrelevant as 
focusing on details versus global structure (see Studies 1 and 2). 
This research introduced the ADNS Scale as an alternative measure of need threat. 
Specifically, the ADNS Scale measures the degree to which the actual perceived need state 
differs from the desired one. This actual-desired comparison distinguishes the ADNS Scale 
from traditional need threat measures that merely focus on the level of the actual need state. 
The ADNS Scale therefore appears particularly suitable when researchers are interested not 
only in differences in situationally experienced belonging, self-esteem, control, and 
meaningful existence, but also in differences in the desired level of needs (cf. Koudenburg, 
Postmes, & Gordijn, 2013). 
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Although our studies provide converging evidence in support of the main hypothesis, 
some remaining questions require further investigation. First, the criterion on which group 
assignment was ostensibly based was fairly neutral (being a detailed perceiver) or positive 
(agreement on opinion). It is an open question whether belonging to a majority would also 
protect the basic needs of high NTBs when possession of the characteristic shared with other 
group members would be unfavorable (e.g., proneness for a specific disease). We speculate 
that majorities based on unfavorable attributes may still provide a sense of belonging, but may 
not contribute to high self-esteem, control, or meaningful existence because the typical 
positive associations would likely conflict with the unfavorable attributes. As belonging to a 
disadvantaged majority should be undesired, however, it is also possible that group 
membership would not have any buffering effects at all.  
By contrast, belonging to a minority group that possesses a rare but desirable 
characteristic (e.g., a specific ability) may contribute to high self-esteem and meaningful 
existence. In line with this assumption, research on the scarcity principle has found that 
individuals evaluate identical characteristics as more extremely positive (or negative) when 
these are ascribed to a minority rather than a majority (Ditto & Jemmott, 1989). Moreover, a 
stronger sense of belonging to the minority has been found when the minority was 
characterized by a positive rather than a negative attribute (Simon and Hamilton, 1994). Yet, 
the minority might be too small as a social resource to help ostracized individuals maintain a 
satisfactory level of the need for belonging. Because of high intercorrelations between the 
four basic needs, it is further unclear whether a boost in self-esteem and meaningful existence 
could also help maintain satisfactory levels of the needs for belonging and control when being 
ostracized. Likewise, a reduced satisfaction of the needs for belonging and control in response 
to ostracism could counteract the strong satisfaction with the needs for self-esteem and 
meaningful existence. These speculations await further investigation. 
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Second, although this work focused on social exclusion effects on basic needs and 
mood, we speculate that group membership may also moderate social exclusion effects on 
behavioral responses. According to the need-fortification hypothesis (Williams, 2007, 2009), 
behavior following ostracism is guided by a desire to restore satisfactory levels of those needs 
most saliently threatened. Williams (2007, 2009) postulates that threats to the needs for 
belonging and self-esteem motivate individuals to behave in ways that help reestablish social 
connections. For example, social exclusion enhances memory for social information (Gardner, 
Pickett, & Brewer, 2000) and increases nonconscious mimicry of and rewards assigned to 
new interaction partners (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & 
Schaller, 2007). By contrast, threats to the need for control and meaningful existence are 
postulated to motivate antisocial and aggressive acts because such behaviors can help people 
recover a sense of control and being noticed (Williams, 2007, 2009; see Tedeschi, 2001, for 
the social control-aggression link). In line with this reasoning, Schoel et al. (2014) showed 
that a reduced threat to the need for control and reduced negative affect result in fewer 
aggressive acts against the perpetrators of social exclusion. Similarly, Warburton, Williams, 
and Cairns (2006) observed no increased aggression following ostracism when control was 
restored after the exclusion experience. As majority groups can protect the basic needs of high 
NTBs, it seems reasonable to predict that for high NTBs belonging to a majority can reduce 
the likelihood of both prosocial and aggressive responses to ostracism.  
Finally, this work investigated the effects of newly assigned groups differing in 
numerical size. Although this is speculative, it is reasonable to predict that making groups 
salient that are perceived as significant (e.g., family, friends, athletic team, work group) may 
also protect some of the basic needs even when the groups are rather small. Consistent with 
this idea, Knowles and Gardner (2008, Study 2) showed that recalling a time when 
participants felt intensely rejected heightened group activation, and that the more meaningful 
and cohesive the activated groups were, the higher was participants’ reported state self-
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esteem. Furthermore, Ren, Wesselmann, and Williams (2013) examined the moderating effect 
of interdependent self-construal on initial need threat and recovery from ostracism. They 
supposed that individuals with a strongly interdependent self-construal would have social 
connections more cognitively accessible, helping them to recover faster from ostracism. 
Indeed, they found that the stronger the interdependent self-construal was, the faster was the 
recovery from threats to belonging and meaningful existence. Perhaps explicitly activating 
significant groups before being ostracized might have an effect that is strong enough to 
moderate even the initial threat to the needs for belonging and meaningful existence. 
Conclusion 
These findings add to a body of research investigating potential moderators of the 
initial response to being ostracized. Across three studies, belonging to a majority reduced the 
immediate impact of ostracism on basic needs for high NTBs. By contrast, belonging to a 
minority or a group of unknown size did not protect basic needs. Given that individuals 
belong to different social groups, high NTBs facing exclusion may benefit from thinking 
about a majority they belong to. Such an intervention could be easily taught to school children 
and thus awaits translational research before being put in practice.  
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Footnotes 
1 We presumed that participants in the unknown group size condition would think that 
about half of the general population belonged to their group of detailed perceivers. This 
assumption was tested and confirmed in Study 2. 
2 In the pretest of the scenario, participants (N = 41; 88% female; Mage = 22.6, SD = 
3.1) reported worse mood and a greater need threat (measured with the same items as in Study 
1) in the exclusion condition (Mmood = 4.89, SD = 1.94; Mneed threat = 4.43, SD = 1.42) than in 
the inclusion condition (Mmood = 7.05, SD = 1.68; Mneed threat = 3.53, SD = 1.05), t(39) = -3.78, 
p = .001, d = -1.18, and t(39) = 2.27, p = .029, d = 0.71, respectively. 
3 This decision receives empirical support from a principal components analysis with 
oblimin rotation. According to the scree test criterion (Cattell, 1966), in Study 1 one factor 
clearly stood out, which explained 53% of the total variance. 
4 In order to assure that need to belong was unaffected by the experimental 
manipulations, we aimed for a time delay by including two other tasks (personnel selection 
task; Rosenberg’s [1965] Self-Esteem Scale) between the dependent variables and the Need to 
Belong Scale. 
5 Simple slopes analyses revealed a nonsignificant slope for low NTBs (- 1 SD), β = -
.10, ItI < 1, but a tendency toward better mood for high NTBs (+ 1 SD) in the unknown group 
size condition than in the minority condition, β = .33, t(97) = 1.76, p = .082. 
6 As with the need threat items used in Study 1, the decision to combine the four basic 
needs measured by the ADNS Scale into a single index receives empirical support from a 
principal components analysis with oblimin rotation. According to the scree test criterion 
(Cattell, 1966), one factor clearly stood out, which explained 66% of the total variance. 
7 Two participants in the majority condition incorrectly indicated belonging to the 
minority and one participant in the minority condition incorrectly indicated belonging to the 
majority.
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Table 1. Statistics of the three-way interactions separately for the four needs in Studies 1 to 3. 
 SE x NTB x MAJ SE x NTB x UGS (Studies 1 & 2)/ SE x NTB x MIN (Study 3) 
 β t p β t p 
Study 1 
Control -.28 -2.09 .039 -.46 -2.75 .007 
Meaningful 
existence -.41 -3.27 .001 -.23 -1.46 .147 
Belonging -.26 -2.34 .021 -.16 -1.11 .271 
Self-esteem -.20 -1.54 .127 -.24 -1.44 .154 
Study 2 
Control -.28 -1.95 .053 .00 0.03 .977 
Meaningful 
existence -.21 -1.47 .144 -.08 -0.59 .558 
Belonging -.14 -0.94 .350 .09 0.63 .527 
Self-esteem -.19 -1.37 .172 .33 2.38 .019 
Study 3 
Control -.26 -1.80 .073 -.13 -0.77 .445 
Meaningful 
existence -.11 -0.78 .439 .12 0.76 .451 
Belonging -.22 -1.64 .104 -.05 -0.33 .746 
Self-esteem -.31 -2.30 .022 -.12 -0.82 .414 
Note. In Study 1 the reference group was the minority condition. In Studies 2 and 3 the 
reference group was the no-group condition. SE x NTB x MAJ = Social Experience x Need to 
Belong x Group (majority vs. minority) interaction in Study 1 or Social Experience x Need to 
Belong x Group (majority vs. no-group) interaction in Studies 2 and 3. SE x NTB x UGS = 
Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group (unknown group size vs. minority) interaction in 
Study 1 or Social Experience x Need to belong x Group (unknown group size vs. no-group) 
interaction in Study 2. SE x NTB x MIN = Social Experience x Need to Belong x Group 
(minority vs. no-group) interaction in Study 3. 
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Figure 1. Point estimates of the need threat index as a function of social experience (inclusion 
vs. exclusion) and group (minority vs. unknown group size vs. majority) for individuals with 
a low need to belong (low NTBs; - 1 SD) and individuals with a high need to belong (high 
NTBs; + 1 SD) in Study 1. The need threat index ranges from 1 to 9 with higher values 
indicating greater need threat. 
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(a) (b)  (c)  
 
 
Figure 2. Depiction of the Cyberball player for participants in the (a) majority condition of 
Studies 2 and 3, (b) minority condition of Study 3, and (c) no-group condition of Study 3. 
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Figure 3. Point estimates of the Actual-Desired Need State (ADNS) Scale as a function of 
social experience (inclusion vs. exclusion) and group (no-group vs. unknown group size vs. 
majority) for individuals with a low need to belong (low NTBs; - 1 SD) and individuals with a 
high need to belong (high NTBs; + 1 SD) in Study 2. The ADNS Scale ranges from 1 to 9 
with higher values indicating greater need threat (i.e., a greater difference between the actual 
and the desired need state). 
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Figure 4. Point estimates of the Actual-Desired Need State (ADNS) Scale as a function of 
social experience (inclusion vs. exclusion) and group (minority vs. no-group vs. majority) for 
individuals with a low need to belong (low NTBs; - 1 SD) and individuals with a high need to 
belong (high NTBs; + 1 SD) in Study 3. The ADNS Scale ranges from 1 to 9 with higher 
values indicating greater need threat (i.e., a greater difference between the actual and the 
desired need state). 
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Appendix 
Actual-Desired Need State (ADNS) Scale 
Belonging 
1. I do not have as strong a sense of belonging as I would like. 
2. I am satisfied with how much others respond to me. (R) 
3. Others do not engage with me as much as I wish. 
Self-esteem 
4. Others treat me with as much respect as I wish to receive. (R) 
5. I have the feeling that others think worse of me than I would like. 
6. At the moment, my self-esteem is lower than I wish. 
Control 
7. I have a feeling of having too little control over what is going on around me. 
8. I have a feeling of having too little influence on what is going on around me. 
9. I have a feeling of not being able to make enough decisions of my own concerning 
what is going on around me. 
Meaningful existence 
10. I have the feeling that others are more indifferent to me at the moment than I would 
like. 
11. I have a feeling of being less important at the moment than I wish. 
12. I have the feeling that others can do without me more easily at the moment than I 
would like. 
Note. Respondents indicated the extent to which each statement applied to their 
feelings following the game on a 7-point scale (pretest) or 9-point scale (Studies 2 and 3), 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 or 9 (very much). (R) indicates that the item is reverse-scored. 
